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In The American Evasion of Philosophy Cornell West makes a comparison between 
the developments of European and classical American philosophies. Within West’s 
analogy, however, two important American figures are missing: Josiah Royce and 
George H. Mead. In the context of this framework, this article attempts to extend 
West’s analogy, speculating on the possible roles of Royce and Mead within it. The 
argumentation is developed in two parts: on the one hand, I show how second-
ary literature that considers Royce-Mead ties reproduces Meadean statements on 
Royce –mainly presented in “The Philosophies of Royce, James and Dewey in their 
American Setting” (1930); on the other hand, I show a schematic analysis of Meadean 
statements on Royce from a historic as well as a systematic pragmatist perspective. 
Keywords: West’s analogy, Royce, Mead, Mead on Royce and American 
philosophy, classical pragmatism, contemporary pragmatism on Royce. 
Resumen 
En The American Evasion of Philosophy Cornell West traza una comparación entre 
los desarrollos de las filosofías europea y norteamericana. Dos importantes au-
tores norteamericanos, sin embargo, están ausentes en la analogía de West: Josiah 
Royce and George H. Mead. En este contexto, me propongo en este artículo ex-
tender la analogía de West especulando sobre los posibles roles de Royce y Mead. 
La argumentación es desarrollada en dos partes: por un lado, muestro cómo la 
literatura secundaria –cuando analiza la vinculación entre Royce y Mead– tiende 
a reproducir la interpretación meadeana de Royce (presentada principalmente en 
“The Philosophies of Royce, James and Dewey in their American Setting” (1930)); 
por otro lado, realizo un análisis esquemático de la interpretación meadeana de 
Royce desde un punto de vista histórico y sistemático. 
Palabras clave: la analogía de West, Royce, Mead, Mead sobre Royce y la 
filosofía norteamericana, pragmatismo clásico, pragmatismo contemporáneo sobre 
Royce. 
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is twofold. On the one hand, I intend 
to show how secondary literature that considers Royce-Mead ties 
reproduces Meadean statements on Royce; on the other hand, I will 
present a schematic analysis of its impact from both a historic and 
systematic pragmatist perspective. In my view, Mead’s interpreta-
tion of Royce’s philosophy is essential not only for the American 
setting of the latter –paraphrasing his article “The Philosophies of 
Royce, James and Dewey in their American Setting” (Mead 1930)– 
but also for a genuine understanding of his own pragmatism and its 
inherent tension. Thus Mead’s psycho-social pragmatist theorizing 
would differ from his interpretation of the meaning of pragmatism. 
Regarding Royce, my basic thesis revolves around the hypothesis 
that Mead’s examination of Royce’s philosophy, rather than pre-
senting an accurate description of the latter, discloses the inherent 
tension of his own general pragmatist perspective.
If Mead’s statements on the development of Royce’s philoso-
phy inside American and pragmatist thought are inadequate, the 
situation of secondary literature is not much better even within 
the current resurgence of interest in classical pragmatism. Two 
striking issues deserve to be highlighted in connection with this 
idea. First, that the connection between Royce’s and Mead’s phi-
losophies is virtually unnoticed in secondary literature despite 
an extraordinary increase in the number of studies on classical 
American tradition and pragmatism, where prominent exponents 
are re-examined and related to one another, as well as contrasted 
and related to philosophers belonging to different traditions –a 
matter that will be referred to in the second section. Secondly, that 
in the scarce mentions found in the literature discussing the rela-
tion between Mead’s and Royce’s philosophies, there seems to exist 
a generalized tendency to repeat Mead’s mistakes concerning the 
interpretation of Royce’s philosophy. In the first place, it is held that 
Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies radically oppose each other; sec-
ondly, the link between Royce and Hegel is excessively highlighted; 
thirdly, Royce’s philosophy is not recognized as a pragmatist one, 
and it is thus not linked with Mead in particular and not with the 
classical pragmatist tradition in general. However, some aspects 
of Miller’s and Joas’s interpretations do contain valuable clues on 
Royce-Mead connections, as I will try to show. 
From my perspective, the integration of these relevant clues 
with an extension of West’s analogy can be the way to overcome 
the shortcomings present in both Mead’s interpretation and in the 
literature on Royce-Mead ties. In other words, such integration 
could allow development of a coherent relation between Royce’s 
and Mead’s philosophies as well as a more comprehensive view of 
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classical American pragmatism. Three steps should be taken for a 
critical full-scale comparison between Royce and Mead: first, to 
examine Mead’s references to Royce’s oeuvre in its own context; 
second, to analyze statements from the secondary literature; and 
finally, to highlight problematical cores of both conceptions and 
attempt to show how they could correct each other.
I have already taken the first step in two articles which mainly 
examine Mead’s own references to Royce’s philosophy.1 The present 
work, meanwhile, must be understood as a second philosophical-
historical step concerned with examining the role of secondary 
literature. Finally, I will complete my approach by fully develop-
ing in a systematic sense my own hypothesis –the Hypothesis of 
Corrective Complementarity– in a coming paper.
1. Extending West’s Analogy
Cornell West schematizes his view on the development of clas-
sical American pragmatism with a deeply ironic analogy: 
American pragmatism reaches its highest level of sophisticated artic-
ulation and engaged elaboration in the works and life of John Dewey. 
To put it crudely, if Emerson is the American Vico, and James and 
Peirce our John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, then Dewey is the 
American Hegel and Marx! On the surface, these farfetched com-
parisons reveal the poverty of the American philosophical tradition, 
the paucity of intellectual world-historical figures in the American 
grain. But on a deeper level, these comparisons disclose a distinctive 
feature of American pragmatism: its diversity circumscribed by the 
Emersonian evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy and the 
Emersonian theodicy of the self and America. (West 69)
One could continue this analogy asking about the role of the 
secondary actors of the play. What philosopher would the English 
pragmatist F. S. Schiller have been? Would Chauncey Wright have 
played the role of the American Bentham? Would Santayana have 
repeated the bitter wisdom of Schopenhauer? Without doubt all 
these roles would have been reasonably assigned. However, follow-
ing the logic of the analogy, two classical pragmatists seem to have 
roles made to measure: Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead.
Within this extended analogy it is possible to think that Royce, 
Peirce’s American Plato, would be the American Fichte. The paral-
lelism between Royce and Fichte could be established if one thinks 
1 Viale, C. “Evasion or Insight? Mead on Royce on American Philosophy”. Cognitio. 
Revista de Filosofia 8/2 (2007): 341-359. And Viale, C. “Revisiting ‘The Philosophies of 
James, Royce and Dewey in their American Setting’. Mead on Royce and American 
Philosophy”. The Philosophy of Pragmatism. Salient Inquiries. Cluj-Napoca 
(Romania): Cluj University Press. (Forthcoming 2008). 
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the former professes or imitates the philosophical futility of the 
latter as has been maliciously and elliptically suggested by A. O. 
Lovejoy in his critic of “[…] the imposture in the pseudo-volun-
tarism of the neo-Fichteans” (cited in Clendenning 342). At first 
sight this association may seem strange due to the perennial link 
between Royce and Hegel. However, with the interpretative license 
granted by West’s analogy, Hegel’s thought seems to prefigure 
Dewey’s practical philosophy rather than Royce’s metaphysical 
one. Then, for the sake of the argument, let’s momentarily sup-
pose Royce’s philosophy reflects in a Fichtean mirror instead of in 
a Hegelian one. 
In connection with Mead, meanwhile, the analogy leads us 
straight to Dewey, i.e., as Dewey is the great American Marx, Mead 
becomes the American Engels. In other words: Engels’s philosophi-
cal developments being both secondary in relation to and dependent 
on Marx’s, Mead’s pragmatism seems to have played a similar role 
in the history of American philosophy in relation with Dewey. 
Although this statement would need a more detailed analysis, again 
for the sake of argument let’s accept the canonical image of Mead, 
i.e. the image that represents him as Dewey’s closest colleague and 
friend at Chicago University but philosophically secondary inside 
the American pragmatic tradition. 
Consequently, rethinking and extending West’s analogy it is 
possible to speculate that Royce’s and Mead’s philosophical profiles 
could have had, in the philosophies of Fichte and Engels, their re-
spective European counterparts. In relation to the purpose of this 
article, it must be highlighted that the analogy can be extended not 
only due to the philosophical similarities that can be found between 
Fichte and Royce (the practical character of truth)2 and Engels and 
Mead (philosophical commitments with revolutionary or reform-
ist praxis) or to the secondary character of their philosophies. Even 
more important is the fact that Engels and Mead as well have also 
had a close relation with the philosophies of Fichte and Royce. To a 
certain extent both Engels and Mead think of themselves as follow-
ers of Fichte and Royce respectively. Engels, for example, argues 
that “we German socialists are proud to descend from not only 
Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel” (7-8). While Mead recognizes Royce’s efforts to develop a 
genuine American philosophy: 
2 An example of the connection between Royce and Fichte can be seen in The Spirit of 
Modern Philosophy where he sums up in a laudatory way Fichte’s position on truth: 
“[…] the deepest truth, then, is a practical truth. I need something not myself, in 
order to be active, that is, in order to exist. My very existence is practical; it is self-
assertion” (Royce 1892 157).
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 [I]t was the passionate struggle of Royce’s great mind to fashion, in 
his philosophy of Loyalty, an expression of this idealism which would 
fit the problem of American thought […]. (Mead 1930 221)
 
Then, Mead can be conceived of as the great American Engels be-
cause, paraphrasing Engels’s quotation, he is not only a successor of 
James, Wundt and Darwin but should also be proud to share philo-
sophical features with Royce’s speculative pragmatism. However, as I 
have tried to show in another paper,3 Mead’s pragmatism is a forked 
one, divided between his own pragmatist developments and his in-
terpretation of the meaning of pragmatism, and while the former 
has similarities with Roycean philosophy, the latter is explicitly 
conceived against Royce’s philosophy. Mead has always designated 
Royce’s philosophy as a Hegelian, Idealist or Romantic one with-
out real or authentic connection with attitudes and habits of the 
American mind. This statement, where he clearly converges with 
Deweyan philosophy, partly helps to configure the canonical image 
of Royce, image that is still being shaped by current literature, as I 
shall try to show in the next section.
2. Looking for Lost Ties
Let’s accept that both classical and contemporary pragmatism 
are, in Bernstein’s words, “a set of narratives in conflict” (55). Let’s also 
agree that not only is Emersonian diversity alive nowadays –as I have 
said– but that the battles are being fought appealing to the names of 
the classics. Then, what was the role of Royce’s and Mead’s narratives 
in conflict? At first sight, four positions on Royce-Mead ties can be 
found in the secondary literature: first, a sharp differentiation be-
tween them; in the second place, a relation based almost exclusively 
on Hegelian inheritance; thirdly, a lack of relation; in the fourth place, 
relevant statements proposed by Joas and Miller.
A clear example of the first position appears in Herbert Schneider’s 
A History of American Philosophy, where he points out an unequivocal 
opposition between both conceptions on the basis of the category of 
“community”:
Another “seminal mind” among the metaphysicians of radical empiricism 
was G. H. Mead. Mead was first of all a social psychologist; he had 
learned to conceive mind, not in terms of individual consciousness, but 
in terms of social acts. He might easily have been tempted to follow the 
idealists like Royce (his teacher) in what he called “the great experience 
of bringing the whole of reality to experience” and to construct a theory 
of reality based on the structure of absolute community. But he did the 
opposite and interpreted the emergence of communities and consciences 
as a more general process of “natural emergence”. (Schneider 550)
3 See footnote 1. 
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I do not agree with this interpretation for three reasons. First, 
because Roycean philosophy is presented in an extremely metaphysi-
cal way, his practical philosophy being conceived of as inevitably 
permeated by the absolute community. In my view, Schneider makes 
the common mistake of conceiving Royce’s philosophy as an idealist 
one, being unaware of the determined attempt at pragmatization in 
Royce’s intermediate and mature work, where a distinction between 
metaphysics and practical philosophy is drawn.4 In the second place, 
because Mead’s naturalist features –unlike his ideal-normative con-
ception– are exclusively and excessively highlighted. Although it is 
true that from a sociological point of view Mead’s position is clearly 
“naturalist” – explaining the genesis of the self, starting from the “un-
conscious conversation of gestures” and the conception of the concrete 
“generalized other”– it is also the case that, from a philosophical and 
ethical point of view, he attempts to connect these natural features 
or elements with ideal conceptions of community and the universal 
“generalized other”. In the third place, due to the inexistent opposition 
between Royce and Mead derived from these unilateral concep-
tions of them, i.e. Royce attempting at an impossible transformation 
of the real community on the basis of the absolute community, and 
Mead’s philosophy grounded only on a naturalistic approach. Only 
by dismembering Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies, radicalizing and 
distorting an aspect of them, is it possible to postulate such an opposi-
tion. That is why Royce’s philosophy is shown as an idealist one, while 
Mead’s philosophy is presented as empiricist-naturalist. As a result, no 
connection can be conceivable between them. 
The second position found in secondary literature, which I ex-
emplify from M. Aboulafia, highlights that, to a certain extent, the 
relationship between Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies allow for a 
connection between the latter and the most acceptable features of 
Hegelian philosophy:
But there is another Hegel; viz., the unrivaled dialectician who gave 
us the dialectic of recognition. Hegel the organic thinker, like Hegel 
the theoretician of the development of the self through the other, left 
an indelible imprint on Mead. To what degree this was a direct im-
print and to what degree it came through Josiah Royce is a question 
worthy of further investigation. (xiv-v)
Although this interpretation clearly diverges from the previ-
ous one by rightly stating that Royce’s philosophy is not necessarily 
opposed to the Meadian conception, I find that the perennial as-
sociation between Hegel and Royce obscures more than clarifies 
4 In Clendenning’s terms: “Royce continued to regard the metaphysical aspects as in-
dispensable, but with The Philosophy of Loyalty, he was beginning to be willing the 
absolute take care of itself, and to enter the twentieth century” (302).
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Royce’s thought, hiding its pragmatist features. Besides, Royce him-
self explicitly rejects this link: 
It is time, I think, that the long customary, but unjust and loose usage 
of the adjective ‘Hegelian’ should be dropped… my own interpreta-
tion of Christianity, in these volumes, despite certain agreements with 
the classical Hegelian thesis, differs from that of Hegel, and of the 
classical Hegelian school, in important ways which I can, with clear 
conscience, all the more vigorously emphasize. (Royce 2001 39)
Also some paragraphs of H. Joas’s book (1997) can be interpreted 
under this perspective: 
The most important thesis of this discussion is that Mead’s approach 
to a theory of intersubjectivity is incomprehensible without an un-
derstanding of his relationship to German idealism, and that on the 
other hand some problems of the German philosophical tradition 
can be solved precisely with the help of Mead’s approach. (11) 
This man was the Christian neo-Hegelian Josiah Royce, who became 
important particularly for Mead’s view of German Idealism, and 
who transmitted to him the basic model of a philosophy of history 
that interpreted the kingdom of God as the historical realization of 
a community of all human beings brought about by universal com-
munication. (id. 17)
However, although these statements seem only to insist on the 
association between Royce’s and Hegel’s philosophy, they contain a 
deep insight, i.e. that the philosophies of Royce and Mead far from 
being radically different –as held by Schneider– are complementary. 
In other words, analogously to Joas’s interpretation about the rela-
tion between Mead and German idealism, it can be held that Royce’s 
and Mead’s works are connected by being mutually corrective. I will 
briefly refer to this topic in the third section.
 The third standpoint present in secondary literature is the ab-
sence of connection, which in my judgment results from the error of 
failing to conceive Royce within the pragmatist tradition, as it can be 
seen in Cook’s conception: “If we want to understand Mead’s view 
of the pragmatic tradition, then, we must turn to his remarks about 
James and Dewey” (1993 162).5 This author holds, on the one hand, 
5 The anonymous referee that has evaluated this paper argues that I am unfair with 
Cook’s view of Royce’s philosophy. The core of the criticism is that, for example 
in his reviews of Joas and Miller (Cook 1974 and 1986), Cook emphazises the con-
nection between pragmatism and idealism. Moreover, in this connection, Royce’s 
philosophy has played a fundamental role. Although this is the case, the point to 
be highlighted is that despite these accurate statements, in his own interpretation 
of Mead’s pragmatism, Cook puts aside Royce’s philosophy. 
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that virtually no connection can be established between Peirce and 
Mead, and on the other hand, he does not include Royce’s phi-
losophy inside the pragmatist tradition, so that Mead’s pragmatist 
connections should be looked for in James’s and Dewey’s works. 
Although the latter idea is right, so is the fact that Mead’s philoso-
phy could have an indirect connection with Peirce’s philosophy 
through Royce’s late works. An example of this conception is ex-
posed in Joas’s book: 
However, from the standpoint of the history of social theory, it is 
most interesting to see that the frequently noted intrinsic kinship 
between Mead’s linguistic theory and Peirce’s ‘semiotic transforma-
tion of transcendental philosophy’ (Apel) does not appear to be due a 
direct influence, but came about through Josiah’s Royce intermedia-
tion. (99) 
The influence unquestionably exercised by Peirce’s theory of signs on 
Mead’s conception of the significant symbol was indirect and came to 
Mead via Royce’s late writings. (id. 37)
However, leaving aside this possibility, if one considers Royce’s 
philosophy as a pragmatist one, there exist direct connections be-
tween Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies, as it can be seen in various 
of the latter’s articles.6 Even more important, if –as Cook does– 
one does not consider Royce as a genuine pragmatist, his link with 
Meadian philosophy is essential to Mead’s characterization of 
pragmatism as different from Idealism and as a typically American 
product, as it can be inferred from “The Philosophies of James, 
Royce and Dewey in their American Setting”.
The fourth position found in secondary literature on Royce-
Mead relation is given by some valuable aspects of D. Miller’s and 
H. Joas’s interpretations. In contrast to other approaches that I have 
examined, they contain statements which are fundamental to a more 
comprehensive understanding of Royce’s philosophy inside classical 
pragmatist tradition as well as a better explanation of the possible 
conceptual relationships between Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies. 
In the first place, David Miller’s article (1975) “Royce and Mead 
on the Nature of the Self” intended a detailed comparison between 
Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies, from which I infer four relevant 
assertions for my work. First, a connection is established between 
Royce and pragmatism: “Royce had several problems in common 
with the American pragmatist” (Miller 87 n3). In the second place, 
similarity is acknowledged between Royce’s and Mead’s concepts: 
6 I analyze this topic in Viale, C. “Revisiting ‘The Philosophies of James, Royce and 
Dewey in their American Setting’. Mead on Royce and American Philosophy” 
(Forthcoming 2008).
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“Royce’s ‘Community of Interpretation’ is similar to Mead’s 
generalized other” (Id. 68). Thirdly, Royce’s influence over Mead is 
justified: 
The fact that Royce was one of Mead’s teachers (1877-1888) is evidence 
enough to suspect that he had a direct influence on Mead. Further 
evidence is that several of the topics in Mead’s Movements of Thought 
in the Nineteenth Century Movements are identical with Royce’s The 
Spirit of Modern Philosophy. (Miller 67)
Finally, some important literature on Royce is analyzed and criti-
cized for failing to establish connections with Meadian philosophy: 
In Cotton’s Royce on the Human Self, the author compares and con-
trasts Royce’s theory with that of Peirce, James and Dewey. But, I 
believe, he might well have considered Mead’s theory also. Fuss, in 
his book, The Moral Philosophy of Royce, has an excellent exposition 
of Royce’s theory of the self but he does not pretend to compare Royce 
and Mead. (Miller 67)
These four assertions are relevant to the present work for two 
reasons. The first one is that the plausibility of a connection between 
Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies is clearly shown by the first three 
assertions, and also that Miller’s proposal of a systematic clarification 
is really valuable, though it must be noticed that his article lacks an 
explanation of Mead’s interpretation of Royce and its consequences 
from a pragmatist viewpoint. The second reason is that Miller’s claim 
about the failure of important secondary literature on Royce to con-
sider possible connections with Mead’s work –to which I could add 
“and vice versa”–is still valid nowadays. I could extend the list made by 
Miller –Cotton’s and Fuss’s books– to include the outstanding Royce 
scholars John Smith, John Clendenning, and Frank Oppenheim. The 
first practically does not include Mead in his conception of the spirit 
of American philosophy. In John Stuhr’s words: 
For Smith, Royce occupies a central position in American philosophy 
and Royce receives more attention than any other thinker. By contrast, 
Smith excludes Santayana from the American philosophical tradition, 
referring to him only twice in passing (once more than to Mead!) (42)
Clendennig’s magnificent book The Life and Thought of Josiah 
Royce mentions Mead only once and so does Oppenheim’s impres-
sive Reverence to Relations for Life. 
Meanwhile, the analysis of the Royce-Mead connection is not 
any better among prominent Mead scholars. For instance, in his 
book (1993) Mead the Making of a Social Pragmatist, Cook does not 
recognize Royce’s philosophy as a pragmatist one, and thus he practi-
cally restricts the connection between Royce and Mead to the latter’s 
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student period. Meanwhile, Joas’s book contains few references to 
Royce’s philosophy, but his suggestions –as I have said before– are 
interesting despite his excessive insistence on the linkage between 
Royce and Hegel. Two issues deserve to be highlighted in Joas’s 
approach. First, from a systematic point of view, that a relation of 
complementarity between Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies can be 
inferred similarly to his idea of complementarity between Mead’s 
conception and German Idealism. Secondly, from a historical point 
of view it is important to stress that this book contains a very de-
tailed description of the diverse lines of research on both Mead’s 
own philosophy and his philosophical relation with other theoreti-
cal schools of thought and that no mention to Royce is made.7 
Several authors make the same mistake as Mead regarding 
Royce-Mead ties. In the first place, Schneider –whose statements I 
have previously analyzed– wrongly holds that Royce’s and Mead’s 
philosophies radically oppose each other. Concerning Mead, he 
explicitly follows Dewey’s pragmatism conceived as opposed to 
Royce’s Hegelian idealism. In his words:
It has been a term of opprobrium that has been cast upon Dewey’s 
doctrine that it is the philosophy of American practicality. But now 
that the world has become somewhat more respectful of us and more 
curious about us it may not, perhaps, be opprobrious to recognize 
the relation of Dewey’s habitat to his philosophic output. In the first 
place it was beyond the Alleghanies, that he formulated his problem 
and worked out the essentials of his doctrine. Though Hegelianism 
flourished in a small and somewhat Teutonic group in St. Louis, which 
was not without its repercussions in America, as witness both Royce 
and Dewey, it was Royce who established the absolute idealisms in 
American thought by making them a part of culture. There was no 
sublimation of the individual in the structure of society in America 
which could make absolute idealism an outgrowth of America con-
sciousness; but as a part of culture it took its place, and the center of 
gravity of this culture was in New England… It is hardly necessary 
to point out that John Dewey’s philosophy, with its insistence upon 
the statement of the end in the terms of the means, is the developed 
method of that implicit intelligence in the mind of the American 
community. And for such an implicit intelligence there is no other 
test of moral and intellectual hypotheses except that they work. In 
the profoundest sense John Dewey is the philosopher of America. 
(Mead 1930 230-1)
In the second place, Aboulafia and Joas highlight with different 
nuances and almost exclusively the linkage between Royce’s and 
7 Although the first edition of Joas’s book dates from 1980, I am referring to the preface 
to the second English edition from 1997.
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Hegel’s philosophies –as Mead did. I have already referred to 
Aboulafia’s and Joas’s analyses. The following is an example of 
Mead’s interpretation:
The possessors of this culture did not through its possession become 
any of the technicians of American society […] The neo-Hegelianism 
which Royce presented so brilliantly, and with an originality of 
his own, was a part of this culture. The Hegelian formulation of 
Romantic Idealism had grown out of just phases of European history 
and civilization which had not been brought over the “Mayflower” or 
on its fellows and followers. (1936 66-7)
In the third place, following Mead in a non critical way, Cook 
fails to recognize Royce’s philosophy as a pragmatist and genuinely 
American one. Thus he neither links it with Mead in particular nor 
with classical pragmatist tradition in general. In Mead’s words:
And no American, in his philosophical moments, regarding the 
sectarian meeting-houses of a western community would have felt 
himself at home in spiritual landscape of Royce’s Blessed Community. 
Notwithstanding Royce’s intense moral sense and his passionate love 
of the community from which he came and to which he continued to 
belong, his philosophy belonged, in spite of himself, to culture and 
to a culture which did not spring from the controlling habits and 
attitudes of American society (1930 222).
I have contextualized and analyzed the scope of these para-
graphs in a previously cited article.8 Within the frame of this work I 
only intend to show the continuities between Mead’s positions that 
have helped to mold Royce’s idealist image and the conceptions of 
the secondary literature. For a re-examination of this image I judge 
it essential to regard aspects of Joas’s and Miller’s interpretations 
and to extend West’s analogy. This is, in my view, the best way to 
reach a better understanding of the ties between Royce and Mead 
and a more comprehensive view of classical pragmatism.
3. Royce-Mead Ties. From a Historical to 
a Systematic Point of View
Royce’s oeuvre has always been besieged by the ghost of the 
Absolute and metaphysical idealism. Although his philosophy, es-
pecially in his first period, gives room to such association, the firm 
intent of pragmatization in Royce’s intermediate and mature periods 
–with his distinction between practical philosophy and metaphysics– 
discloses a pragmatist face of Roycean philosophy which remains 
virtually unnoticed, except for a handful of scholars. A direct con-
sequence of this pragmatization may be that practical philosophy 
8 See footnote 1.
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instead of metaphysics is the very core of Royce’s mature thought. 
However, the figure of the metaphysical idealist Royce –molded by 
classic pragmatists, especially by Dewey and Mead– is the one that 
appears again and again even in the current secondary literature. 
Therefore, in order to take to pieces this image is necessary to re-
cover relevant clues mentioned in the literature and to integrate 
them with a coherent proposal.
In my view, the interpretations of Joas’s and Miller’s on the 
ties between Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies, in contrast to other 
analyzed approaches of the literature, contain valuable clues from 
a historical as well as a systematic point of view. From a historical 
standpoint, they show, on one hand, the existence of connections 
between Royce’s and Mead’s oeuvres. On the other hand, their 
analyses of the literature reveal lack of a single full-scale work 
devoted to this topic. From a systematic point of view, as I have pre-
viously said, the central issue that can be inferred from Joas’s and 
Miller’s clues revolves around the possibility to develop a Corrective 
Complementarity between Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies, analo-
gous to the one proposed by Joas for Mead and German Idealism. 
Such corrective complementarity between Royce’s and Mead’s 
practical philosophies depends on the following conditions: 
First, from a sociological perspective a criticism based on Mead’s 
thought can be drawn about Royce’s way to establish a distinction 
between natural community and Beloved Community in The Problem 
of Christianity. Second, from a metaphilosophical point of view and 
in favor of Royce, it is possible to support the need for some kind of 
coherent distinction between a natural and ideal community, being 
lack of a coherent and systematic conception of ideal community 
the Achilles heel in Mead’s thought. Concerning this interpretative 
strategy, I have presented a more detailed argumentation in other 
works.9 Besides, a systematic presentation and defense of my hypoth-
esis is beyond the scope of the present article and it would require an 
independent argumentation. However, I do intend to highlight that 
the possibility of such a systematic hypothesis completely depends 
on regarding as conceivable the linkage between Royce’s and Mead’s 
practical philosophies. Consequently, my strategy rests on a kind of 
“deconstruction” of Royce’s idealist image, shaped by Mead –among 
others– and kept by secondary literature. In other words, the histor-
ic-philosophical steps I have mentioned –Mead’s references to Royce 
in my previous article –and expounded on– the analysis of second-
ary literature that I am presenting– are prerequisites of intelligibility 
of my systematic approach.
I should make it clear that I am not following Royce’s philosophy 
religiously, disguising its theoretical problems and shortcomings as 
9 See footnote 1 and also Viale, C., Márgenes del pragmatismo. 
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pragmatism. Royce’s conception of natural community, for example, 
is sociologically weak. However, I think that it is necessary to es-
tablish Royce’s setting inside classical pragmatism and American 
thought before considering typical Roycean issues. If it can co-
herently be supported –taking seriously Royce strong attempt 
of pragmatization in his intermediate and mature periods– that 
Royce’s philosophy is a pragmatist one that clearly distinguishes 
between concrete (or natural) and ideal (or Beloved) community, 
it could begin to lose its metaphysical halo and to leave its peren-
nial place as the American idealist opponent of classical pragmatists. 
Royce’s philosophy, then, would not be the necessary reverse of 
classical pragmatism imagined by Mead but a pragmatist practical 
philosophy attempting to establish a connection between natural 
and ideal community in a Peircean way. The central issue at hand 
would therefore be how these relevant clues –and the interpretation 
I infer from them– could fit with the extension of West’s analogy 
that I am proposing herein. Although West’s analogy is a perceptive 
way to understand classical American philosophy from Emerson to 
Dewey, Royce’s and Mead’s philosophies do not play a significant 
role in it. What would be, then, the best way to incorporate them 
inside West’s perspective? It must be stressed that West’s analogy 
attempts to point out in the American grain a philosophical process 
similar to the European one. In this sense, American counterparts 
of European philosophers do not necessarily share their doctrines 
and philosophical tendencies entirely, but a similar position inside 
an internal development. Therefore, as much as Dewey is the great 
American Marx, if one follows West’s analogy, it is clear that Mead 
would play the role of the American Engels.
Turning to Royce, why would Fichte be his European coun-
terpart? Royce would not be the American Fichte either because 
he repeated his pseudo-imposture –in Lovejoy’s words– or only 
because they shared similar philosophical commitments on some 
issues. More important is the role that he could play if conceived 
of as the American Fichte. For my purposes, the main point to 
highlight is that, had Royce been regarded as the American Fichte, 
Mead –the American Engels– would have thought of himself, to a 
certain extent, not as an antagonist but a follower of Royce’s phi-
losophy. As a result, Mead’s pragmatism would not have bifurcated 
–as I maintain– into his own pragmatism and his interpretation 
of pragmatism. Consequently, extending West’s analogy so as to 
incorporate Royce and Mead into it as the American Fichte and 
Engels respectively, allows to conceive, on the one hand, a more 
comprehensive view of classical pragmatism and, on the other, a 
better linkage between Royce’s and Mead’s practical philosophies. 
“Deconstructing” Royce’s idealist image from a historical point of 
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view would therefore allow to find the ties between the Roycean 
conceptions of natural and Beloved Community and the concrete 
and universal senses of the generalized other that, to my judgment, 
exist in Mead’s philosophy. This systematic approach, however, is a 
task for a following article.
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